Prof. Svein Eng
Allmenn rettsteori/ Rettsfilosofi
Momentsett 6.2
«[T]he reason for the validity of a judicial decision or an administrative command is not the fact [min utehving] that a judge has actually rendered the decision, or an administrative organ has actually issued the command, but the statute authorizing the judge to render decisions and the administrative organ to issue commands. The reason for the validity of statutes is the constitution, authorizing an individual or a body of individuals to issue statutes. If it is historically a first constitution, and if the reason for the validity of this constitution cannot – from the point of view of a positivistic theory of law – considered to be a superior order created by a divine, superhuman will, authorizing a certain individual or a body of individuals to establish the constitution, the reason for the validity of the constitution and hence of the statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative commands established on the basis of the constitution can only be a norm we presuppose, if we are to interpret the acts whose subjective meaning the constitution, the statutes, the judicial decisions, the administrative commands are, as objectively valid norms. A norm is presupped according to which men ought to behave in conformity with the constitution, hence in conformity with the general norms issued on the basis of the constitution by legislation or custom and, finally, in conformity with the individual norms issued on the basis of statutes or customary law by judicial and administrative acts; that is to say, in conformity with the legal order in its hierarchical structure. This norm, which is not a positive norm – not a norm created by an act of human or superhuman will, but only presupposed in juristic thinking – is the reason for the validity of a positive legal order. It is called the basic norm. Its presupposition is the condition under which every coercive order established by acts of human beings and by and large effective, may be interpreted as a system of objectively valid norms» (Kelsens uthevinger med mindre annet er sagt).[1]
Som vi ser gir Kelsen i dette sitatet også en formulering av grunn-normen. Denne formulering synes å uttrykke samme realitet som Kelsens øvrige formuleringer. Til illustrasjon av Kelsens uttrykksmåte vedrørende grunn-normen stilles i det følgende noen av Kelsens mest sentrale formuleringer etter hverandre:
«[One] ought to behave in conformity with the constitution, hence in conformity with the general norms issued on the basis of the constitution by legislation or custom and, finally, in conformity with the individual norms issued on the basis of statutes or customary law by judicial and administrative acts; that is to say, in conformity with the legal order in its hierarchical structure» (Kelsens utheving).[2]
«Zwangsakte sollte gesetzt werden unter den Bedingungen und auf die Weise, die die historisch erste Staatsverfassung und die ihr gemäβ gesetzten Normen statuieren. (In verkürzter Form: Man soll sich so verhalten, wie die Verfassung vorschreibt.)»[3]
«Zwang soll gesetzt werden unter den Bedingungen und auf die Weise, die der erste Verfassungsgeber oder die von ihm delegierten Instanzen bestimmen: das ist die schematische Formulierung der Grundnorm einer Rechtsordnung ...».[4]
For å forstå nødvendigheten av Kelsens grunn-norm, og den derved konstituerte rettslige normativitet, er det nødvendig konsekvent å fastholde et førstepersonsperspektiv. Gjør vi det, vil vi se at vi kommer til et punkt hvor vi enten må anta Kelsens grunn-norm, og den derved konstituerte rettslige normativitet, eller oppgi tanken om retten som et særskilt og normativt (rettsorden) system (rettsorden).
Kelsens grunn-norm har etter dette en dobbelt funksjon: Den er en nødvendig betingelse for rettslig normativitet (gyldighet), i kontrast til rettslige fenomener som fakta. Og den er en nødvendig betingelse for rettens enhet, i kontrast til rettslige fenomener som en mengde innbyrdes løsrevne fenomener.